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Abstract
This article is a contribution to interdisciplinary scholarship addressing the presump-
tion of innocence, especially interdisciplinary conversations between philosophers
and jurists. Terminological confusion and methodological traps and errors notori-
ously beset academic literature addressing the presumption of innocence and related
concepts, such as evidentiary presumptions, and the burden and standard of proof in
criminal trials. This article is diagnostic, in the sense that its primary objective is to
highlight the assumptions—in particular, the disciplinary assumptions—implicit in
influential contributions to debates on the presumption of innocence. It advocates a
methodologically pluralistic approach, according to which definitions of the presump-
tion of innocence are necessarily sensitive to purpose and method. These relationships
and their implications are not always appreciated, and are seldom explicitly elucidated.
Notably, philosophers (and some legal scholars) routinely treat the presumption of
innocence as (in some sense) epistemic, evidentiary or otherwise featuring directly in
practical reasoning. This article identifies jurisprudential and practical reasons why
legal scholars and practitioners (and possibly others) concerned with criminal pro-
cedure and evidence should reject evidentiary interpretations of the presumption of
innocence. By encouraging finer-grained engagement with the history and institutional
details of common law procedural traditions, the article aims to show why legal schol-
ars might think that philosophical approaches to the presumption of innocence are
already methodologically-loaded and, for our purposes, address the wrong questions
with deficient concepts.
Keywords Presumption of innocence · Jurisprudential method · Interdisciplinary
theorising · Criminal procedure · Legal presumptions
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1 Introduction: method in presumption
The ‘presumption of innocence’ is ubiquitous in contemporary discussions of legal
process and criminal justice. It is regularly invoked in policy debates and popular
media, and is a constant source of fascination and perplexity for legal scholars as
well as for scholars from other disciplines, especially philosophers, who concern
themselves with normative standards in legal procedure. Popularity is not necessarily
conducive to conceptual perspicacity or analytical rigour. Being widely regarded as
A Good Thing, the presumption of innocence attracts inflated rhetoric. Claims that
a particular legal doctrine or official practice offends the presumption of innocence
might be little more than visceral reactions to perceived—but unanalysed, unexplained
and unrationalised—intuitions of ‘unfairness’. In their efforts to be more considered,
academic discussions of the presumption of innocence frequently relate it to cognate
concepts such as evidentiary presumptions and the burden and standard of proof in
criminal adjudication. Indeed, there is an observable tendency to treat (some of) these
concepts as synonymous, raising suspicions of conceptual laxity or partly camouflaged
argumentative manoeuvres. The presumption of innocence is prone to presumptuous
(mis)usage by theorists as much as by politicians or the media.
Unwarranted presumptions about the presumption of innocence are problem-
atic, especially in interdisciplinary discussions. For example, a perfectly serviceable
philosophical conception of the presumption of innocence may be maladapted to
jurisprudential or law reform requirements, but this incongruity might not be fully
appreciated by the philosopher advancing it, or by later glossators (philosophers
or anybody else) extending the original conception beyond its competent sphere of
application. This kind of problem reflects a familiar and profound challenge of inter-
disciplinary endeavours. It is difficult to shake off one’s own disciplinary assumptions
even when self-consciously traversing disciplinary boundaries. A related difficulty
is primarily terminological, and well-known to comparative legal scholars. Cross-
jurisdictional legal research is complicated both by the same terms being used with
different meanings, and by different terms being used to mean the same thing, in
different legal systems (for elucidation, see Chiesa 2014; Nelken 2007). Analogous
terminological difficulties stalk cross-disciplinary conversations. The natural default
assumption is that competent language users mean (broadly) the same thing when they
say (largely) the same thing, but this plausible generalisation wears thin in relation
to disciplinary jargon and professional terms of art. Standard disciplinary usage may
offer false friendship in interdisciplinary conversations.
These platitudes would hardly be worth mentioning, were it not for the fact that
methodological traps and errors infest academic literature addressing the presumption
of innocence and related concepts. By ‘traps’ I refer to propositions or approaches that
are not inherently erroneous, but lie in wait to snare the unwary. From the perspective
of methodological pluralism (which I endorse), definitional concepts, motivations and
methods are mutually conditioning. I think of the relational nature of these three pri-
mary vectors as the Eternal Triangle of intellectual inquiry (ET) (see Roberts 2017a,
b). For the purposes of the present discussion, ET implies that the best or most appro-
priate concept of the presumption of innocence depends on the purposes for which it is
being deployed and the methods that are being used to investigate it. Change the pur-
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poses and/or the methods of research and the best definition might need to be adjusted
accordingly. Choice of definition in this sense extends to the domain of the inquiry and
its ‘problematic’, i.e., the specification and nature of the problem to be investigated or,
phrased more generically, the research question(s) to be answered. There are, then, no
innocent concepts and no innocent research projects, because all conceptual defini-
tions build in (implicit or explicit) preferences regarding the researcher’s motivations
and methods. From the vantage point of methodological pluralism operationalised by
ET, two features of the presumption of innocence literature are striking. First, authors
hardly ever specify their objectives at this methodological level. Rather, they typically
assume that their purposes are self-evident, and shared by other contributors to the
discussion, essentially by extrapolation from their own disciplinary assumptions and
orientation. Secondly, much of the debate is conducted in the apparent belief that
the objective must be to specify the best definition of the presumption of innocence
(and related concepts), as though one conception of the concept must be superior for
all purposes. The debate is conducted as a tournament between rival conceptions, in
which most of the participants (apparently) share the dogmatic assumption that there
can only be one outright winner of the contest. But this is a deeply suspicious, and
presumptuous, presumption from the perspective of methodological pluralism.
This article is diagnostic, in the sense that its primary objective is to highlight
the assumptions—in particular, the disciplinary assumptions—implicit in influential
contributions to debates on the presumption of innocence. I have my own views about
the best conception of the presumption of innocence (and related concepts), and I try
to be clear that they reflect the purposes of an English jurist specialising in criminal
procedure. Sensitivity to context does not imply self-imprisonment in an introverted
disciplinary silo: my conception of the presumption of innocence might, and hopefully
does, have comparative value for legal scholars in other jurisdictions and intellectual
value for scholars in other disciplines. But anybody using it for any purpose other than
that originally intended should proceed with circumspection and at their own risk, with
no general warranty of fitness for purpose.1 Caveat emptor, as lawyers say. Although
I will not be coy when asserting theoretical preferences, this article does not promote
my own conception of the presumption of innocence at the expense of potential rivals
in any comprehensive way. True to the tenets of methodological pluralism, it merely
demands reciprocity. By identifying the unacknowledged (disciplinary) assumptions
framing other contributions to the debate and being explicit about my own, I hope
to puncture any extravagant claims to unitary solutions whilst steering legal scholars
and interdisciplinary researchers away from enticing entrapments, misunderstandings,
fallacious reasoning and erroneous conclusions.
2 Framing presumptions
We may begin with two presumptions about the presumption of innocence that are
widespread and in my opinion acceptable, subject to some cautionary observations.
1 Cf. Husak (1983, p. 350), warning that ‘[m]any philosophers look to the law of evidence for an account
of the operation of the presumption of freedom. I believe this reliance is somewhat misguided, and that a
correct analysis of the presumption of freedom cannot draw too heavily from the law of evidence’.
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First, it is generally assumed that the presumption of innocence is normatively signifi-
cant. Virtually every contribution to contemporary debates grapples with questions of
definition and application whilst presupposing that the presumption itself, however so
defined or applied, is valuable. Strictly speaking, the value of the presumption must
turn on what it actually means or does or signifies in theory or practice. If one reckoned
the presumption of innocence ‘a worm-eaten dogma of bourgeois doctrine’2 it would
not figure in any normative ideal of criminal adjudication. Its residual importance, if
any, would only be descriptively sociological. Perhaps the presumption of innocence
operates as a mystificatory ideological smokescreen for capitalist exploitation? Even
if that were true, pointing it out would be changing the subject, abandoning rather
than contributing to normative theorising. Even the radical sceptic or global error the-
orist must meet normative arguments with normative refutations, or start a different
conversation. Given that the presumption of innocence has a very long history rooted
in foundational texts of (western) civilization (Cascarelli 1996) and is today embed-
ded in national legal constitutions (Bassiouni 1993, pp. 265–267) and basic human
rights instruments structuring modern international relations (Jackson and Summers
2012, Chap. 7; Trechsel and Summers 2005, Chap. 7), it seems reasonable for scholars
concerned with the normative underpinnings of criminal adjudication to assume its
importance and to get to work on cashing out what the presumption actually does or
should entail in theory and practice.
Secondly, it is routinely asserted that terminological usage surrounding the
presumption of innocence is inconsistent, incontinent, confused and potentially mis-
leading, so that some preliminary definitional work is required if we are to make any
meaningful progress in elucidation, explanation, or practical reform. This is not merely
to repeat the familiar methodological injunctions to define one’s terms with clarity and
precision, and to employ them consistently. More fundamentally, the worry is that if
‘the presumption of innocence’ is such an amorphous and protean notion that it can
mean just about anything (presumptively positive) that a particular speaker wants it to
mean, it will lose all critical bite and analytical usefulness. This is the explicit point
of departure for Rick Lippke’s recent systematic reconsideration of the presumption:
A bewildering variety of claims have been made about the meaning and impli-
cations of the presumption of innocence in criminal law. Given its apparent
elasticity, it is natural to wonder whether the presumption is an honorific con-
cept, one that is mostly empty and therefore adaptable to the needs and interests
of legal theorists of diverse kinds. (Lippke 2016, 11)
In view of the conceptual liberties being taken by ‘legal theorists’, Lippke concludes
that the presumption of innocence needs ‘taming’ for the sake of its own continued
vitality. His principal strategy is to cut down the presumption’s scope of operation
to its ‘native habitat’ (ibid., 11), in the belief that a concentrated dose will be more
effective than a diluted solution:
2 Fletcher (1968, p. 1205), quoting Deputy Shirkov, Pravda, 27 December 1958. More recently, see Quigley
(1989, p. 303), observing that ‘[t]he dominant opinion in both the Western and Soviet literature is that a
presumption of innocence is found in Soviet law’.
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Instead of trying to make the PI do more work than it is capable of or suited for,
I argue that we ought to tame it: We should confine it to the trial context, where
what it means, how it functions, and what are the consequences of its rebuttal
can be tolerably well-defined and defended…. Only in the trial context does a
full-on presumption of innocence, on the part of those tasked with rendering
verdicts, have a defensible role to play. (ibid., 4, 9)
There is a great deal of methodological presumption crammed into this statement of
theoretical intent, which I will attempt to unpack presently. But first it should be noted
how the problem of conceptual incontinence has suggested alternative solutions to
scholars with different theoretical and practical agendas.
Writing from the more doctrinally-orientated perspective representative of common
law Evidence scholars, PJ Schwikkard shares the general concern that the presumption
of innocence should not be mistaken for something that it is not, but her particular
worry is that ‘potential definitional difficulties arise if we do not distinguish between
those rights that are coherent with the presumption of innocence and the presumption
of innocence itself’ (Schwikkard 1999, p. 36). She has in mind, specifically, the right
of silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, and it is these other procedural
rights that, on her account, need to be insulated from the corrosive implications of
conceptual imperialism:
The danger of conflating the presumption of innocence and other separately
enumerated rights, is that those rights become vulnerable to the argument that
in situations where the presumption of innocence is not applicable, or where
the burden imposed by the presumption of innocence has been discharged, then
those rights no longer apply. (ibid., 37)
Schwikkard’s preferred solution is to opt for an unapologetically narrow conception
according to which ‘the presumption of innocence contains two components: (1) a
rule requiring the state to bear the burden of proof and (2) a directive that the burden
will only be discharged when guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt’ (ibid.,
29). On this view, the presumption of innocence just is the decision rule for criminal
adjudication specifying a particular allocation of the (ultimate) burden of proof—to the
prosecution—and a particular standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt. Schwikkard
is South African, but her interpretation of the presumption of innocence would be
entirely familiar to (not necessarily endorsed by) legal scholars across the common
law world. In my criminal law jurisdiction, England and Wales, we might describe this
as ‘the Woolmington principle’, after the celebrated case in which Viscount Sankey LC
declared that ‘[t]hroughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread
is always to be seen, that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the prisoner’s
guilt… If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is a reasonable doubt…
the prosecution has not made out the case and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal’.3
English legal scholars sometimes expressly endorse the narrow conception of the
3 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462, 481-2 (HL). It is sometimes pointed out that Viscount Sankey was
as much creating as stating the rule in terms of his rhetorical golden thread, but I do not myself think that
this reduces the contemporary constitutional significance of the principle. See further Smith (1987) and
Farmer (2018).
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presumption of innocence advocated by Schwikkard, and I suspect many more do so
implicitly and unthinkingly. It should, to be sure, occasion no surprise if disciplinary
outsiders approaching the Law of Evidence gained the impression that legal scholars,
lawyers and courts routinely or standardly equate the presumption of innocence with
the burden and standard of proof in criminal adjudication. Most of us have been guilty
of this situationally convenient conflation at one time or another.
But remember: caveat emptor! Such remarks are not necessarily very well consid-
ered as normative ethical or legal propositions, and even when they are, their validity
may be strictly delimited by their context of application. Jurisprudence should not
be mistaken for philosophy at large because it operates under peculiar (and more or
less particularised) institutional constraints. One very important set of constraints,
which is alien to other ‘scientific’ endeavours and for this reason easily overlooked
or underestimated, relates to the jurisdictional nature of law. Principles of political
morality necessarily undergo important modifications in the process of their institu-
tional (including jurisdictional) instantiation (see e.g., Gardner 2000; Summers 1997;
MacCormick 1985). Criminal adjudication is jurisdictional in two major dimensions
pertinent to the present discussion. First, criminal adjudication concerns alleged crim-
inal wrongdoing, not other types of legal claim such as private law, employment or
family disputes. Secondly, criminal adjudication is delimited by the criminal laws
of particular territorial jurisdictions. Both of these institutional constraints operate
in tandem to regulate the validity of statements of, or about, law and legal process.
Some high-level normative generalisations apply to adjudication in general. We can
say, for example, that judges should be independent and impartial; that fact-finding
should conform to rational precepts of evidence evaluation and proof; and that trial is
superior to gladiatorial combat as a pacific means of dispute resolution, without speci-
fying particular kinds of legal process. Other, lower-level generalisations are confined
to more circumscribed institutional contexts. For example, it makes sense to say that
‘the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty’ only in the context of criminal
adjudication (indeed, we only speak of the criminally ‘accused’: parties to other kinds
of legal proceeding are styled ‘defendants’,4 ‘plaintiffs’, ‘claimants’, ‘applicants’, and
so on). Likewise, some doctrinal generalisations are competent across territorial legal
jurisdictions. I have already employed one myself, when I said that Schwikkard’s
conflation of the presumption of innocence with the burden and standard of proof
in criminal adjudication would be entirely recognisable to common lawyers around
the world. My remark leaves open the possibility that this conflation would not be as
familiar to civilian jurists or other non-common lawyers. Indeed, I doubt it is: because
‘inquisitorial’5 models of adjudication, featuring a proactive judge charged with pri-
mary responsibility for truth-finding (with or without the assistance of lay jurors),6
are not (fully) compatible with the common lawyer’s conception of a party-allocated
4 True, ‘criminal defendant’ is synonymous with ‘the accused’. My only point is that ‘the accused’ is
specialised language marking out a unique legal (and social) status. The ready availability of a common
synonym might sometimes work to obscure the accused’s special status in criminal proceedings, but it does
not detract from its normative, and jurisprudential, significance.
5 A (still) handy generalisation, invoked with the usual caveats: see further Roberts (2008) and Langer
(2014).
6 See e.g., Taxquet v Belgium (2012) 54 EHRR 26 (GC), [29]; and more generally, Clermont (2009).
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burden of proof. Be that as it may, the more general methodological point stands:
doctrinal propositions always relate to particular territorial jurisdictions. Some are
general enough to apply to all or most of the world’s legal jurisdictions, and these—nec-
essarily, relatively abstract—generalities include fundamental human rights norms and
principles of natural justice. Other doctrinal propositions might be limited to a sub-
set of territorial legal jurisdictions, or even to just a single, idiosyncratic jurisdiction.
Generally speaking, as doctrinal argument or analysis becomes more fine-grained and
institutionally concretised its trans-jurisdictional validity diminishes. Sometimes doc-
trinal propositions only really make sense when related to other finely-drawn features
of their native institutional environment.
It is not self-evident why, or how much, these jurisprudential generalisations matter
for debates about the presumption of innocence. It might be thought, for example, that
the presumption of innocence must be a trans-jurisdictional legal principle because
otherwise it could not feature, in the way that it indubitably does, in global or regional
human rights instruments. That thought is demonstrably inchoate. For one thing, it
would not settle any question about the potential application of the presumption of
innocence outside the ‘fair trial’ context, whereas contemporary theoretical debates
concerning the presumption range more broadly across criminal process and beyond.7
For another, it invites the retort that the presumption, qua international human right, is
nothing more than rhetorical hand-waving in the direction of penal justice. One need
not be a strong sceptic about the normative value of the presumption of innocence to
point out that international human rights instruments typically assert allegiance to the
presumption without actually specifying what it entails.8 Moreover, the interpretational
jurisprudence of international courts deploying the presumption of innocence has a
strong flavour of judicial improvisation, as particular tribunals confront a succession
of ‘hard cases’ with fairly unpredictable outcomes and feel their way towards new
doctrinal prescriptions in the absence of clear legislative guidance.9
Instructive as this judicial experience may be, a point of still greater methodolog-
ical profundity needs to be stressed. Theoretical discussions of the presumption of
innocence characteristically proceed at the level of conceptual and normative gen-
eralisations. This is especially, and understandably, true of discussions involving
philosophers and jurists, whose normal field of reference tends to be bounded by
linguistic rather than jurisdictional borders (hence we can speak intelligibly of ‘Anglo-
American legal theory’ and the like) and who—to be blunt—generally neither know
nor care very much about the detailed doctrinal specifications of procedural law in par-
ticular territorial jurisdictions. However, the Eternal Triangle teaches that every such
methodological choice comes with relational baggage incurring freight costs, and
that these must be paid for in the currency of selective definitions and motivational
7 Nance (1994) makes an influential contribution to more expansive debates. For systematic discussion,
see Lippke (2016, Chaps. 3, pp. 6–9).
8 Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights, for example, simply announces that
‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law’.
9 See e.g., Allenet de Ribemont v France (1995) 20 EHRR 557; Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v Spain
(1989) 11 EHRR 360, [76]–[77]; Salabiaku v France (1991) 13 EHRR 379, [28]; and the miscellany of
cases surveyed by Campbell (2013).
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pre-commitments. If there are important features of the presumption of innocence,
possibly extending to its normative core, that can fully or properly be appreciated only
at the level of doctrinal particularity, the best account of the presumption (relative
to contextual jurisprudential objectives and methods) will evade general theorising’s
grasp. Those theorists who presuppose that the presumption of innocence must be a
general normative ideal are already making a big assumption that few, if any, pause to
defend.10
A great deal more argument and explanation are required to work up ET’s abstract
methodological question-mark into a well-substantiated prescription for thinking more
clearly about the presumption of innocence. Before venturing further in that direction
and providing at least the outline of such an argument, let me give a final example to
illustrate how rival conceptions of the presumption of innocence are, in part, largely a
reflection of their own (presumptuous) methodological assumptions.
As recently as 1990, Jeffrey Reiman and Ernest van den Haag expressed surprise
about the lack of serious theoretical engagement with the familiar thought that criminal
adjudication should take special care to avoid convicting the innocent. Specifically,
Reiman and van den Haag contemplate ‘the common saying that it is better that ten
guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer’, which common lawyers frequently
ascribe to Blackstone and to which civilian jurists sometimes attach the Latin tag in
dubio pro reo. Although pretty much everyone agrees that convicting the innocent is
worse than acquitting the guilty, Reiman and van den Haag mused, ‘it is difficult (and
for us so far, impossible) to find systematic attempts to defend the maxim. It is treated
as a truism in no need of defense’ (Reiman and van den Haag 1990, p. 226). Yet,
Reiman and van den Haag continue, ‘the principle within it is not at all obvious; and
since it undergirds many of our criminal justice policies, we should be sure that it is
justifiable’ (ibid.).
Reiman proceeds to argue that the maxim is justified by overlapping deontological,
consequentialist and contractarian rationalisations. He concedes that each of these
arguments requires an element of imaginative supplementation, and even a bit of
‘bullying’ in relation to traditional conceptions of retributive justice (ibid. 231), but
maintains that attractive versions of retribution, deterrence and social contract theory
all subscribe to the ‘punishing innocence is worse’ maxim. Van den Haag counters
that none of these three prominent philosophical traditions supplies a convincing jus-
tification and consequently rejects the maxim, along with the traditional requirement
of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ (which he takes to be implied by it), in favour
of a contextually flexible standard of proof set at ‘clear and convincing evidence’
for the majority of cases (ibid., 248). Like many critics of ‘proof beyond reasonable
doubt’ before and since, van den Haag cannot see any good reason of principle for
10 See e.g., Tadros (2014). As far as I can tell, Tadros seems to be addressing (only) other theorists when
he makes sporadic methodological claims such as this: ‘Surely there is something deficient in this provision
[i.e., any criminal offence modelled on Sexual Offences Act 2003, § 9–13, criminalising underage sex
irrespective of consent in fact]. If this does not constitute interference with the presumption of innocence,
what right or value is implicated in this case? Better to see this provision as interfering with the presumption
of innocence, for in that case, we [ philosophers?] can scrutinize carefully whether the interference was
justified’ (ibid. 460). The most obvious answer to Tadros’ (rhetorical) question is that the value implicated
is the injustice of convicting people of serious offences in the absence of any (sufficient) moral wrongdoing.
But his consequent ‘better to…’ is a non-sequitur. It simply begs the methodological question.
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systematically sacrificing the overall accuracy of adjudication in order to safeguard
the innocent, given that acquittals of the guilty also impose social costs (principally,
additional future victims of crime owing to the presumptively reduced deterrent and
incapacitative efficacy of criminal sanctions).
A notable methodological feature of Reiman and van den Haag’s shared approach
is the immediate link they forge between the questioned maxim and a putative ‘pun-
ishment constraint’. As they elucidate:
If the task were to prove the literal truth of the claim that it is more than ten
times worse to punish an innocent person than to acquit a guilty one, it could
not be accomplished. We possess neither moral intuitions nor moral theories
which could establish such a specific ratio. However, we can separate the core
content of the constraint from the specific ratio proposed. After all, the truism
is not a carefully quantified principle but a slogan meant to convey a message
quickly and memorably. Shorn of rhetoric, the punishment constraint asserts that
it is morally worse to punish innocent people than to acquit guilty ones. This
is the part of the constraint that most matters, since, if we came to believe that
punishing the innocent was no worse than acquitting the guilty, our criminal
justice policies should change in important ways. For example, we might lower
the standard of proof of guilt in criminal cases. (Reiman and van den Haag 1990,
pp. 226–227)
To be sure, the value of the presumption of innocence seems intuitively connected to the
importance of not punishing innocence, at least to the extent that this can realistically
be avoided.11 In legal doctrinal terms, this connection is institutionalised in the form
of an epistemically demanding standard of proof for criminal convictions.12 Reiman
and van den Haag are, in my opinion, well justified in rejecting numerically quantified
interpretations of Blackstone’s maxim, but I have major doubts about what supposedly
follows. Even if we thought that punishing the innocent is no worse than acquitting the
guilty, it is far from obvious why this should have any practical bearing on the formal
standard of proof in criminal adjudication, let alone qualifying as the most logical
or emblematic policy implication of rejecting the maxim. What is, to all intents and
purposes, an essay in penal theory rapidly loses interest, and analytical rigour, when
it comes to the institutional details of criminal procedure.
If the disciplinary lacuna perplexing Reiman and van den Haag effectively boils
down to wondering why so little has been written by penal theorists about the presump-
tion of innocence and related concepts, the mystery is largely dissipated. Criminal law
and penal theory, like law teaching more generally, have traditionally concentrated
on issues of substantive law and their normative philosophical foundations, relegating
11 The possibility of convicting the innocent by mistake is an inherent feature of the human epistemic
condition and in itself provides no objection to running the risk of mistaken conviction of the innocent for
good reason: see Alexander (1983).
12 On the jurisprudential foundations of English criminal law’s steeply asymmetric standard of proof, see
Roberts and Zuckerman (2010, Chap. 6).
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evidentiary and procedural questions to the margins.13 This is (merely) a sociological
observation about legal scholarship, amenable to explanatory conjectures but hardly
defensible in principle.14 Meanwhile Evidence scholars, for their part, have continu-
ously engaged with the presumption of innocence without perceiving any need, arising
form their own jurisprudential projects, to relate it back to foundational penal ratio-
nales.
This break in the chain of argumentation is not merely a curious artefact of academic
tribes and their segmented (sub)disciplinary literatures. It reflects significant differ-
ences of scholarly motivation and method, as ET should prime us to expect. Moreover,
these discrepancies have real-world practical implications. Those who approach the
issue from the perspective of penal theory—or normative theorising more general-
ly—will naturally tend to interpret the presumption of innocence as a substantive
constraint on convicting the morally innocent, of whom the factually innocent are
merely an epistemologically interesting subset. There is no knock-down conceptual
barrier to treating the presumption of innocence as a bar to convicting the morally
blameless, and some theorists have argued in favour of affording the presumption
of innocence this kind of substantive purchase (see, e.g., Tomlin 2013; Tadros 2007).
The problem with many such imaginative reinterpretations of the presumption of inno-
cence for anybody seriously concerned with the institutional realities of criminal law
is that, however normatively attractive the theory might appear in the abstract, such
interpretations are mostly15 non-starters from a doctrinal point of view. For example,
it was entirely predictable that judges would emphatically reject ‘substantive’ inter-
pretations of Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights and insist
that its doctrinal impact is purely procedural (Roberts 2002a). And this is exactly
what happened when the issue was expressly litigated, first before domestic English
courts16 and then to the European Court of Human Rights.17 Philosophers are entitled
to argue that all judges are collectively in the grip of normative delusion, but the luxury
of traducing authoritative institutional materials is not available to jurists,18 at least for
as long as they want to address their jurisprudential arguments to lawyers and courts.
13 A representative example is Alexander (2002), who implicitly characterises the field as 60% General
Part, 30% Special Part, 10% punishment theory, and a few incidental remarks about the burden of proof
and presumptions.
14 For sustained criticism of the status quo and remedial suggestions, see Twining (2006), Roberts and
Redmayne (2007) and Roberts (2014a, b).
15 This qualification acknowledges the possibility of (limited) substantive effect in legal systems, such as the
USA, where proof beyond reasonable doubt is conceptualised as being mandated by federal constitutional
due process. See further, Michaels (1999), Dripps (1987) and Jeffries and Stephan (1979).
16 R v G [2009] 1 AC 92, [2008] UKHL 37, [27] (Lord Hope): ‘Article 6(2)… as a whole is concerned
essentially with procedural guarantees to ensure that there is a fair trial, not with the substantive elements
of the offence with which the person has been charged. As has been said many times, article 6 does not
guarantee any particular content of the individual’s civil rights. It is concerned with the procedural fairness
of the system for the administration of justice in the contracting states, not with the substantive content of
domestic law’.
17 G v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR SE25, [26]–[27]: ‘It is not the Court’s role under Article 6(1) or
(2) to dictate the content of domestic criminal law, including whether or not a blameworthy state of mind
should be one of the elements of the offence or whether there should be any particular defence available to
the accused’.
18 This point is not restricted to common lawyers: see Knigge (2013) and Weigend (2013).
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In jurisprudence, unlike normative philosophy, prominent institutional facts cannot
simply be ignored or wished away as inconsequential deviation. As the old common
law maxim has it, communis error facit ius. Or to restate the same point in more for-
mal philosophical terms, ‘legal truth, like truth regarding the meaning for conventional
terms of language, is a function of collective (medium-term) judgment… therefore it
is a misunderstanding to believe that legal officials could be globally mistaken about
legal matters for significant periods of time’ (Bix 2009, p. 547).
3 A dose of traditional common law thinking
The puzzlement and disorientation expressed by theorists such as Reiman and van den
Haag are hardly surprising, in view of the conceptual fog enveloping the presumption
of innocence and its terminological cousins. Their claim that the ‘common saying’,
preferring ten acquittals of the guilty to one conviction of an innocent, had eluded previ-
ous attempts19 at rationalisation is more contentious. Legal scholars specialising in the
Law of Evidence might think that the salient issues have received copious jurispruden-
tial attention spanning several centuries. However, the way in which the presumption
of innocence has been conceptualised in traditional common law thinking is not what
might be imagined by theorists unfamiliar with pertinent institutional sources. The
‘presumption of innocence’ is both less and more, jurisprudentially speaking, than
modern theoretical reconstructions generally recognise.
James Bradley Thayer, the godfather of Anglo-American Evidence law theory, was
bemoaning ‘the confusion and ambiguity that hang over the common talk about the
presumption of innocence in criminal cases’ (Thayer 1897, p. 185) whilst Queen Vic-
toria still reigned. In his customarily fastidious fashion,20 Thayer set out to restore
conceptual order and reinstate doctrinal orthodoxy, in order to staunch ‘that feeble
administration of our criminal law which is doing so much in these days to render
it ineffectual’ (ibid.). His ground-clearing commences by noting the ancient histori-
cal connection in English legal doctrine between the presumption of innocence and
certain ‘humane maxims, rules of procedure, and practical adjustments’, prominently
including ‘the principle that it were better that a guilty person should be unpunished
than that an innocent one should be condemned’ (ibid. 186–187). Thayer took it as
self-evident that the general sentiment rather than quantified numbers or ratios—which
have fluctuated over time21—was the predominant message:
19 They do say ‘systematic attempts’, but unless this is a merely semantic gambit to make the claim true
by definition, I assume that a rationalisation that explains all that needs to be explained about the maxim
qualifies as systematic for these purposes.
20 Thayer (1898) provides a compact introduction to the Thayerite method.
21 Reiman and van den Haag (1990, n 2) quip that ‘[t]here has been some inflation since Sir Matthew
[Hale, in 1694]… put the ratio at 5:1’. But in the fifteenth century Fortescue expressed the ratio as 20:1, so
it might be more apposite to speak of deflation down to Blackstone. Or equally meaningful (meaningless)
to say that Hale was inflating, since most of the Biblical and classical sources go only as far as the view
attributed to Aristotle, that ‘every one of us would rather acquit a guilty man as innocent than condemn an
innocent man as guilty… For in each of these cases if the charges were true we should prefer to vote for
their acquittal on the charges against them, rather than to vote for their condemnation, if the charges were
untrue’: see Volokh (1997, p. 181, n 45).
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Obviously these phrases are not to be taken literally. They all mean the same
thing, differing simply in emphasis—namely, that it is better to run risks in the
way of letting the guilty go, than of convicting the innocent. (ibid. 187)
Thayer was at pains to reaffirm the limited doctrinal significance of the presumption
of innocence, by way of antidote to ‘our hysterical American fashion of defending
accused persons’ which had, so Thayer thought, lent to the maxim ‘an extraordinary
stretch’ (ibid. 189–190). What did institutionally authoritative precedents have to say
on the matter?
[I]n the last [eighteenth] century and the early part of this [nineteenth century], we
shall find very little, indeed almost nothing, about the presumption of innocence.
But a great deal will be found, a very great emphasis is placed, upon the rule
that a party must be proved guilty by a very great weight of evidence. That
is the important thing. And I think it will be found that, in English practice,
down to our time, the presumption of innocence—except as a synonym for
the general principle incorporated in that total phrase which expresses the rule
about a reasonable doubt, namely, that the accused must be proved guilty, and
that beyond a reasonable doubt—plays a very small part indeed…. That is the
simple, intelligible, plain way in which the presumption of innocence is dealt
with in important cases in England. The prisoner is, indeed carefully protected,
but his bulwark is not found in any emphatic or strained application of the phrase
or the fact of a presumption of innocence. (ibid. 190–1, 192)
The doctrinal accuracy of Thayer’s depiction of English law is all the more remarkable
for retaining its currency throughout most of the ensuing twentieth century, essen-
tially right up until the advent of the Human Rights Act 1998, which revolutionised
(Roberts and Hunter 2012) this aspect of English criminal procedure. There are only
seven reported English cases referring expressly to the ‘presumption of innocence’
for the entire period between the inauguration of official law reporting in 1865 and
the mid-1990s, and none of these glancing mentions is jurisprudentially significant
or illuminating (Roberts 2007, pp. 415–416). Woolmington itself refers to presuming
innocence only in passing. Traditionally, common lawyers have consistently regarded
the workaday burden and standard of proof in criminal adjudication, rather than the
more pretentiously inflated presumption of innocence, as the main juridical event.
Prior to Thayer, James Fitzjames Stephen had written that ‘the general presumption
of innocence… though by no means confined to the criminal law, pervades the whole of
its administration’ (1883, p. 438). Stephen characterised the presumption of innocence
as a ‘rule’ with several subparts anticipating and broadly corresponding with the
Woolmington principle. He added that ‘[i]t is also closely connected with the saying
that it is better that ten guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should
suffer’, the idea often (misleadingly) expressed as ‘the Blackstone ratio’ in modern US
legal literature (see, e.g., Zalman 2018; Allen and Laudan 2008). Stephen, however,
rejected the saying as (already in the late nineteenth century) an anachronistic relic of a
barbarous legal history. Stephen’s chief objection to any putative Blackstone ratio was
pragmatic: he saw no necessary connection between legal procedures well-calibrated
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to convict the guilty and heightened risks to the innocent. If anything, insisted Stephen,
the risks to innocence run in the opposite direction to the aphorism’s supposition:
[I]t assumes, in opposition to the fact, that modes of procedure likely to convict
the guilty are equally likely to convict the innocent, and it thus resembles a
suggestion that soldiers should be armed with bad guns because it is better that
they should miss ten enemies than that they should hit one friend. In fact, the rule
which acquits a guilty man is likely to convict an innocent one. Just as the gun
which misses the object at which it is aimed is likely to hit an object at which it
is not aimed. (Stephen 1883, p. 438)
Stephen was over-generalising. Whether, in fact, ‘the rule which acquits a guilty man
is likely to convict an innocent one’ turns on concatenated situational contingencies;
it cannot state any universal truth about accuracy in criminal adjudication. Notwith-
standing his exaggeration, Stephen was here marking a vital empirical consideration
that too many contemporary commentators overlook. The best way to protect the inno-
cent from wrongful conviction may be to try to enhance the reliability and probative
value of information presented to factfinders such that apparent guilt, on the evidence,
is reliably indicative of actual guilt, in fact. The complexities of that simple-sounding
aspiration are enough to fill a library of textbooks on police investigations and criminal
procedure. Suffice it for present purposes to note that the discovery and development
of powerful new forensic technologies such as DNA profiling have probably done far
more to enhance the accuracy of criminal adjudication without materially increasing
the risks of mistaken convictions of the innocent22 than any marginal tinkering with
formalised proof standards could ever hope to achieve.
Granted that mistaken convictions of the innocent are worse (in some to-be-clarified
normative sense) than mistaken acquittals of the guilty, loose talk of a Blackstonian
ratio encourages the thought that it might be possible, and useful, to quantify these
values and calculate their optimal distribution. The desirable standard of proof will be
that which produces the appropriate level of trade-off between one kind of mistake and
the other (see, e.g., Lillquist 2002; Laudan 2006; cf. Picinali 2013). However, this puta-
tive calculation is not nearly as straightforward as might appear, because standards of
proof do not single-handedly determine error ratios in adjudication (also see Risinger
2007). Much also depends on (1) how many of those tried are actually innocent (the
smaller that proportion becomes, the less likely it is that an innocent person will be
convicted, all else equal); and (2) the effectiveness of trials in discriminating between
guilt and innocence (imagine an evidential litmus test for guilt with a miniscule false
positive rate: then very few innocent people would be convicted even on a ‘balance
of probability’ standard, because anybody the jury convicts would nearly always be
22 I am not overlooking the fact that invalid, corrupted, contaminated or even planted or perjured DNA
profiling evidence may itself be the cause of miscarriages of justice: for a striking instance, see Gans
(2012). Judgments of evidential value are all relative to the viable alternatives. The question is not whether
DNA profiling evidence is infallible (it plainly isn’t), or how it performs relative to some notional idealised
standard of reliability, but rather how it fares compared with eyewitness testimony, confessions, business
documents, police records and other types of scientific evidence routinely admitted in criminal trials. The
general answer is, as proof of identity, much better.
123
Synthese
correctly identified as guilty23). Notably, a standard of proof set at 0.9124 probability
of guilt will not, as many have erroneously imagined, produce a Blackstone-mirroring
ratio of 10 false acquittals for every one false conviction, except under rather stringent
empirical assumptions (DeKay 1996). Instrumental, or avowedly consequentialist,
approaches to framing the standard of proof in criminal trials run into a host of theo-
retical, empirical and normative objections (the literature is vast: see e.g., Epps 2015;
Picinali 2018; Sunstein and Vermeule 2005; Steiker 2005). Besides, there is scant
institutional basis, in English law or in wider common law materials, for treating the
standard of proof as any kind of quantified, calculable ratio. Even if—contrary to
the historical record—one thought that the numbers in the canonical Blackstone ratio
were supposed to be meaningful, no court, judge or legislature has to my knowledge
ever argued that 10:1 should be a target to aim for in error distribution. Rather, the
more fully articulated thought seems to run along the lines of ‘we would be prepared
to tolerate 10 mistaken acquittals for every mistaken conviction, if the former were
unavoidably necessary to minimise the latter’. Decision theorists typically assume a
more or less hydraulic relationship between true positives and false positives (to con-
vict more guilty you must convict more innocent), and between false negatives and
true negatives (to acquit more innocent you must acquit more guilty). This assump-
tion begs the question. Jurists such as Stephen have traditionally denied that tolerating
acquittals of the guilty will correspondingly safeguard innocence, as we have seen.
In summary, if your main objective is to insulate innocent accused from wrongful
conviction you would be well advised to concentrate on enhancing the reliability of
judicial evidence, taking account of the entire process (including guilty pleas),25 rather
than attempting to extrapolate institutional reform from a popular maxim that (so far
as I know) has no formal doctrinal status in any modern legal system, common law
or otherwise. If Blackstone’s maxim boils down to a rhetorical commitment to strive
to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction, why is this not best honoured by
efforts to increase accuracy across the board so long as traditional procedural protec-
tions, including the asymmetric burden and standard of proof at trial, are preserved? At
the very least, the policy issue is not engaged unless and until it is shown that efforts to
convict the guilty concomitantly increase the risks of convicting the innocent, beyond
the truistic—and morally irrelevant—observation that every single additional trial adds
to the absolute actuarial risk (just as additional funding for the police or building more
courtrooms will presumptively result in a larger absolute number of mistaken convic-
tions, holding all else—including the existing ratio of false positive and false negative
verdicts—equal). In terms of more comprehensive theorising, traditional common law
thinking has contributed disappointingly little to conceptual elucidation of the ‘pre-
23 Or try this Genesis-derived thought experiment, as suggested by Volokh (1997, pp. 177–178): ‘God…
killed the entire human population of the Earth because of its wickedness (except for Noah and his family)
in a mass capital punishment which, although carried out without the benefits of a jury or any other due
process protections, apparently also produced neither false positives nor false negatives. It is said that 1 day
there will be another massive (post-) capital punishment, which will also produce neither false positives
nor false negatives’. But these are clearly liminal cases, as Volokh cautions: ‘These methods… may only
be acceptable criminal procedure for God Himself, Who may do whatever He likes’.
24 Because the ratio 10:1  10/11  0.91.
25 For a cold shower of socio-legal realism, see e.g. Brown (2016), Field and Eady (2017) and McConville
and Marsh (2014, 2016).
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sumption of innocence’ and downplayed its significance in doctrinal analysis. The
path to unimpeded theoretical reconstruction is apparently open and clear. Yet as we
will see, there are jurisprudential roadblocks ahead.
4 Evidentiary versus jurisprudential presumptions
Definitional reset is the theorist’s first reflex when confronted with conceptual muddle.
Antony Duff seeks to deliver us from confusion by reconsidering, and reframing, the
essential tasks for a coherent and normatively attractive conception of the presumption
of innocence. According to him:
If we are to understand the meaning and implications of this presumption (or
presumptions)… we must address several questions. What is to be presumed, by
whom, of whom? What is the effect of that presumption? What can defeat it?
(Duff 2013, p. 170)
These are perfectly logical, reasonable and potentially illuminating questions, posed
within the analytical framework of normative philosophical inquiry. But they also con-
tain an unacknowledged presupposition with significant methodological ramifications.
The presupposition is made explicit by Lippke, who broadly adopts Duff’s analytical
heuristic:
Duff’s succinct statement of the complexities raised by the presumption of inno-
cence anticipates many of the distinctions I draw… I take literally the notion
that the PI is a presumption. As such, it is a deliberately adopted perspective on
persons suspected of or formally charged with crimes. (Lippke 2016, pp. 1–8)
These innocent-sounding presuppositions invite closer methodological scrutiny and
critical diagnosis.
In the following discussion, I will refer to conceptions of the presumption of inno-
cence which require criminal process actors and decision-makers (or, indeed, anybody
else) to hold certain beliefs or make particular assumptions as ‘evidentiary’ con-
ceptions. A subset of these evidentiary conceptions is more properly ‘epistemic’,
in relating to actual beliefs of those involved in the administration of criminal jus-
tice. Evidentiary conceptions may be contrasted, generically, with what I will call
‘jurisprudential’ conceptions, according to which compliance with the presumption
of innocence is fundamentally a question of how people should be treated—as if they
were innocent—regardless of anybody’s actual beliefs or factual presumptions. One
could say that treating someone as if they were innocent is tantamount to treating
them as if one believed they were innocent, or involves entertaining such a belief
(without actually holding it), or something of that sort. But I do not perceive any
good theoretical or practical reason for thinking or speaking in that way. Beliefs of the
relevant kind are not doing any analytic or normative work in jurisprudential concep-
tions of the presumption of innocence. I can treat you as though you are innocent (in
every way consistently with how an innocent person should be treated) irrespective
of any belief about your guilt or innocence, or even if I confidently believe, perhaps
even know, you are guilty. More routinely, criminal justice professionals may neither
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know nor care whether the accused is factually guilty or not. Discharging their institu-
tionally allocated responsibilities in the administration of justice does not, in general,
require police, prosecutors or defence lawyers to form any view about suspects’ or the
accused’s factual guilt or innocence (though doubtless there is more to say, from the
perspectives of cognitive psychology, strategic institutional design and professional
training, about the practical attitudes that we should try to cultivate in our criminal
justice professionals in order better to serve the normative value of the presumption
of innocence).26
The availability of jurisprudential (non-evidentiary) alternatives demonstrates that
the methodological strategy adopted by Lippke and Duff involves a choice. From
my jurisprudential perspective, moreover, their choice seems ill-advised. This section
explains why evidentiary conceptions of the presumption of innocence exhibit poor
fit with authoritative institutional materials in the common law tradition, and impose
numerous uncomfortable theoretical compromises. More seriously still, evidentiary
conceptions of the presumption of innocence are prone to a persistent type of con-
ceptual confusion that is especially perplexing in evidentiary scholarship and legal
practice. From a jurisprudential perspective, it will count heavily against any concep-
tion of the presumption of innocence that it operates on legal reasoning like mogadon
or mental kryptonite.
Even absent detailed doctrinal expertise, more narrowly epistemic conceptions of
the presumption of innocence have always struck me as fishy, for the elementary (meta-
physical) reason that beliefs are not directly subservient to the will. Instructing a jury
at the start of a trial to believe that the accused is innocent would hardly be calculated
to make jurors actually believe it. Jurors will believe what they believe, and if they
have any common sense they will realise that the individual standing in the dock didn’t
accidently fall into the courtroom from the sky. And given that this is all so obviously
true, any judicial direction to the effect that the jury should believe the accused to
be innocent would inevitably run the risk of sounding hollow and possibly hypocriti-
cal, a mere institutional ritual rather than a serious-minded procedural safeguard, and
thus potentially self-defeating as an expression of genuine commitment to avoiding
conviction of the innocent.27 In fact, jurors are never told to presume innocence in
the epistemic sense. They are generally told that they should not convict the accused
unless they are confident he is guilty; that if any plausible interpretation of the evidence
supports innocence they must acquit; and that this is how the hallowed presumption
of innocence is, in practice, respected in criminal adjudication (if ‘the presumption
of innocence’ is expressly mentioned at all in particularised judicial directions).28
The traditional injunction is, in essence, to suspend belief until all the evidence and
26 Ferguson (2016) makes a start on this project, but follows Duff in adopting an evidentiary conception
of the presumption of innocence.
27 I take this to be a conclusive pragmatic objection to the well-known argument advanced by Laufer
(1995).
28 Trial judges in England and Wales should direct the jury ‘as follows: (1) It is for the prosecution to
prove that D is guilty. (2) To do this, the prosecution must make the jury sure that D is guilty. Nothing
less will do. (3) It follows that D does not have to prove that he is not guilty. If appropriate: this is so even
though D has given/called evidence’: Judicial College, The Crown Court Compendium—Part I: Jury and
Trial Management and Summing Up (December 2018) § 5–8; www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications/crown-
court-bench-book-directing-the-jury-2 (accessed 15 January 2019). Note that the canonical phrase ‘beyond
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arguments have been heard in the trial, signalling ‘emphatic caution against haste in
coming to a conclusion adverse to the prisoner’ (Stephen 1883, p. 438).
Larry Laudan has devoted considerable time and energy to demonstrating that it
makes no epistemological sense for the jury to believe that the accused is factual-
ly—or in his terminology, ‘materially’—innocent, and concludes, with a flourish, that
‘innocencem is an idle wheel in most of the machinery of justice’ (2006, p. 98).29
From the perspective of criminal jurisprudence, this conclusion is trivially orthodox.
Criminal proceedings, from investigation to trial, are by design structured exercises
in identifying the guilty. Preliminary investigative measures may be authorised on
the basis of limited information (‘reasonable suspicion’, ‘probable cause’), but more
coercive interventions propelling suspects deeper into the adjudicative process are
generally predicated on higher, more demanding epistemic thresholds. Prosecutions
in England and Wales cannot lawfully continue unless there is a ‘realistic prospect of
conviction’,30 which comes close31 to saying that the reviewing lawyer must regard
the accused as probably guilty or the case should be dropped. Within this structured
procedural environment (and assuming broadly effective policy implementation), if
individual jurors were asked at the beginning of a criminal trial to state truthfully
what they believed about the accused’s guilt or innocence—a question which, in real-
ity, jurors are never asked—the only rational response would be that the accused is
probably guilty. Laudan, who mostly discusses secondary commentaries and rather
selective primary legal sources, treats these prosaic facts as revelations with poten-
tially damaging implications for conventional understandings of the presumption of
innocence. But there is nothing troubling to see here. Any ostensible difficulties are
artefacts of conceptualising the presumption as epistemic, and simply fall away when
the presumption of innocence’s epistemic pretentions are renounced, in accordance
with common law orthodoxy.
Lippke does not regard prosaic features of the administration of criminal justice
(with which he is admirably well-acquainted) as problematic for his preferred ver-
sion of an epistemic (or, more broadly, evidentiary)32 presumption of innocence. His
Footnote 28 continued
reasonable doubt’ is no longer employed in directing criminal trial juries in England and Wales: R v Majid
[2009] EWCA Crim 2563; R v Alikor [2004] EWCA Crim 1646; R v Derek William Bentley [2001] 1 Cr
App R 326 (CA), [49].
29 Also see Laudan (2005, p. 359): ‘The presumption of innocence is a double misnomer. It is patently not
a presumption but an assumption; and, at least in a system with a proper standard of proof, the PI has little
or nothing to do with “innocence” in the sense in which that term is almost certainly construed by lay jurors.
Properly understood, the PI is little more but no less than an assumption of no-proof-of-guilt at the outset
of a criminal trial’. This passage could have been written by Thayer or Stephen in the nineteenth century.
30 Code for Crown Prosecutors (CPS, October 2018), §4.6–4.7, www.cps.gov.uk/publication/code-crown-
prosecutors (accessed 15 January 2019).
31
‘[A] realistic prospect of conviction is based on the prosecutor’s objective assessment of the evidence… It
means that an objective, impartial and reasonable jury or bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case alone,
properly directed and acting in accordance with the law, is more likely than not to convict the defendant
of the charge alleged’: CPS Code, ibid. Belief in a realistic prospect of conviction on the evidence might
dovetail with belief in factual guilt (on the balance of probability), but they are not isomorphic, and the
distinction may have some significance for prosecutors’ professional duties: see G. Williams (1985) and
Worboys (1985).
32 Lippke equivocates on the question of what, exactly, jurors are enjoined to believe or presume by the
presumption of innocence. He seems to take on-board the non-volitional quality of beliefs (‘Beliefs are
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solution to the challenge of conceptual incontinence is to endow the presumption of
innocence with real practical bite by significantly narrowing down its scope of appli-
cation. Lippke argues that ‘[o]nly in the trial context does a full-on presumption of
innocence, on the part of those tasked with rendering verdicts, have a defensible role to
play’ (ibid. 9).33 Thus, the tactic is to save the presumption of innocence by ‘taming’
it: ‘My intention… is to develop and defend a systematic account of the PI, one that
assigns it an important and intelligible role in the criminal justice system. But it is a
limited role, far more so than many legal scholars would assign it’ (ibid., 31). Lippke
thus positions himself as, in my (non-judgemental) terms, a conceptual dogmatist. He
is constrained to say that when scholars, criminal justice professionals, policymakers
or ordinary people invoke the ‘presumption of innocence’ in other contexts they are
always34 confused or abusing terminology, or at any rate not employing the concept in
the most effective or appropriate way. In this, Lippke parts company with Antony Duff,
who is prepared to contemplate employing different conceptions of the presumption
of innocence, in different contexts, and for different purposes.35 But Duff is only a
half-hearted pluralist about the presumption of innocence, as we shall see.
It strikes me that Lippke pays a heavy price for stipulating a narrow, trial-centric
conception of the presumption of innocence. It is not obvious to me why lawyers or
laypeople are necessarily making any kind of conceptual error or linguistic faux pas
when they invoke the presumption of innocence in relation to, for example, pre-trial
Footnote 32 continued
not the kinds of things that can be willed or intentionally taken on’: 2016, p. 13), but later asserts that
‘the instruction tells jurors to evaluate the government’s case against the accused as they would evaluate
evidence of wrongdoing against persons in whose law-abidingness they are confident’ (ibid. 100–101). The
best sense I can make of this idea boils down to the more familiar thought that jurors should give every
accused the benefit of the doubt before hearing the evidence and seriously entertain the possibility that any
accused, more particularly the one now standing in their charge, just might be innocent. I cannot see how this
instruction, which essentially reminds jurors of fundamental institutional features of our system of criminal
adjudication, is more vividly or effectively communicated by the feat of imagination recommended by
Lippke. More seriously for his thesis, I cannot see how this collective thought experiment involves anything
properly described as a factual presumption. Try it for yourself: what do you presume (without actually
believing) when you imagine that the accused standing before you, charged—let us say—with a horrible
murder, rape or child abuse, or perhaps a string of armed robberies or household burglaries, or of industrial-
scale drug trafficking, is ‘a trusted friend or coworker’ (ibid)? Even if (contrary to my strong impression)
this procedure is psychologically intelligible, there remains the non-trivial task of encapsulating it in robust
directions to the jury. Or you could just remind the jury that ‘innocent until proven guilty’, in our system,
means that you mustn’t prejudge the case, but listen carefully to all the evidence presented and tested in the
trial and only find the accused guilty if the prosecution’s evidence and arguments, taking proper account of
the defence’s counterclaims, convinces you that he is. No hypotheticals, no factual beliefs, no evidentiary
presumptions: simples.
33 I interpret ‘full-on’ as stylistic verbiage. There is no textual indication that Lippke wants to advance
a bifurcated conception, according to which the presumption of innocence has ‘full-on’ and another (‘not
full-on’? ‘half-full-on’? ‘half on, half off’?) variants.
34 Granted that some of them are sometimes confused or speaking rhetorically.
35
‘[I]f we are not… bound to a specific statutory provision, we can take a more relaxed approach, and talk
of not one but many PoI: of different presumptions made by and about different people in different normative
contexts, with different effects, defeasible in different ways. Such presumptions will be connected to each
other in a larger web of values; but we will not need to argue that they can be unified into a single PoI’
(Duff 2013, p. 172).
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investigative measures,36 systematic data-gathering for the purposes of criminal intelli-
gence,37 or post-trial conduct by officials.38 If the gist of the presumption of innocence
is a prohibition against treating people who have not (yet) been convicted of a criminal
offence as though they have already been convicted of it, it is natural to think that a
broad spectrum of activities might potentially breach the presumption. To be sure, the
presumption’s precise contours and implications will need to be elucidated in relation
to particular procedural phases and types of activity, and—to my knowledge—this
can be done only through context-specific normative and jurisprudential argument,
with proper regard for institutional factors and jurisdictional diversity. There can be
no peremptory victory on disputed points of political morality, as though invoking
the presumption of innocence amounted to ‘playing the joker’ in formulating criminal
justice policy. So I would go along with the general thrust of Lippke’s complaint that
the presumption of innocence does not really stand for all that some of its proponents
would like it to, but not with his proposed solution.
Instead, I would characterise the presumption of innocence as a second-order nor-
mative rationale for more particularised institutional doctrines and practices, especially
those concerned with structuring criminal investigations, prosecutions, trials and post-
conviction procedures. This conceptualisation is congruent with Stephen’s somewhat
enigmatic remark, previously quoted, to the effect that ‘the general presumption of
innocence… though by no means confined to the criminal law, pervades the whole of
its administration’ (Stephen 1883, p. 438).39 In this guise, the presumption of inno-
cence plays an important diagnostic role in flagging up situations in which its core
value would be imperilled unless government power is adequately constrained—either
wholesale through legislation, or on a case-by-case basis through the faithful applica-
tion of existing legal norms and the wise exercise of official discretion. As it happens,
I also largely concur with Lippke’s insightful discussion of particular aspects of crim-
inal law and process and with the substance of his analysis; except that Lippke thinks
it necessary to invent new names for principles associated with this broader sphere
of penal regulation, such as ‘the societal presumption against punishment’ (Lippke
2016, p. 59, pp. 72–74) and the ‘nonpresumption of guilt’,40 whereas I would say that
we already have perfectly good names for the most significant principles, including
names well-rooted in existing procedural traditions and institutional practice (e.g., the
Woolmington principle; in dubio pro reo; the presumption of liberty41; the mens rea
36 E.g., Sir Cliff Richard v BBC and Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2018] EWHC 1837 (Ch),
[239]–[250].
37 Cf. S and Marper v UK (2009) 48 EHRR 50 (GC). For discussion, see (Campbell 2010).
38 For a variety of arguable instances, see R v Bagnall [2013] 1 WLR 204; Serious Organised Crime Agency
v Gale [2011] 1 WLR 2760, [2011] UKSC 49; R v Cook (Sam) [2012] 1 WLR 2451, [2012] EWCA Crim
6; R (Adams) v Secretary of State for Justice [2012] 1 AC 48, [2011] UKSC 18.
39 For more modern and comparative reinforcement, see e.g., Elias (2018, p. 38), Chief Justice of New
Zealand contending that ‘[t]he presumption of innocence compels a number of subsidiary rules of evidence’.
40
‘The PI must be distinguished from a nonpresumption of guilt’ (ibid. 6).
41
‘The notion of the personal autonomy of every individual marches with the presumption of liberty enjoyed
in a free polity: a presumption which consists in the principle that every interference with the freedom of the
individual stands in need of objective justification’: R (Wood) v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2010]
1 WLR 123, [21], CA (Laws LJ). Also see Laws (2017). An analogous ‘principle of liberty’ or ‘minimum
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principle42). Perhaps the most revealing illustration of the exorbitant costs of Lippke’s
conceptual dogmatism is the logical implication that the presumption of innocence
cannot be a human right, in part because ‘it must be defeasible in the pre-trial con-
text, or else police and prosecutors will be unable to do their jobs’ (ibid. 49). This
means that, on Lippke’s account, the right announced by Article 6(2) of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (and transposed into English law by the Human
Rights Act 1998), that ‘[e]veryone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law’, is not actually part of the presumption
of innocence, or only a counterfeit version of the authentic normative concept. North
American legal theorists might not be unduly troubled by this discrepancy, but English
criminal lawyers plainly should be.43 Presumably, we would have to work with (at
least) two concepts of the presumption of innocence, the normatively justified one and
the European Court of Human Rights’ specious doctrinal doppelgänger.44 All of this
trouble stems directly from Lippke’s epistemic/evidentiary presumption. As soon as
we ditch the idea that anybody must actually presume anything about innocence, there
is no difficulty in saying that the scope of the presumption as it applies in pre-trial (or
post-conviction, etc.) proceedings must be circumscribed by the pragmatic realities
and other normative strictures of criminal process. Indeed, I am not sure why this
elegant solution is not already suggested by Lippke’s decidedly odd-sounding talk of
‘rebutting’ the presumption of innocence.45 It seems to me that the presumption of
innocence is something that, in ordinary parlance, one may be afforded (or denied),
like trial by jury or a second vote on Brexit, but not something that can be ‘rebutted’,
‘disproved’ or ‘weighed’ evidentially.
Footnote 41 continued
state intervention’ is propounded as one of the ‘five foundational principles of criminal evidence’ by Roberts
and Zuckerman (2010, § 1.3).
42 See e.g., R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr App R 14, [2005] EWCA Crim 706, [37] (referring to ‘the general,
indeed obvious, principle that mens rea is an essential ingredient of every statutory offence unless it is
expressly excluded, or excluded by absolutely necessary implication’); Srowger v John [1974] RTR 123;
R (Morgan Grenfell & Co) v Special Commissioner of Income Tax [2001] EWCA Civ 329, QBD, [14]
(Buxton LJ). For further discussion, see Chan and Simester (2011) and Horder (1997).
43 Indeed, all lawyers and jurists in the 47 states parties to the ECHR should be troubled by it. Also see
Knigge (2013). For the avoidance of any doubt, let me add that the ECHR is completely separate from the
EU and the UK’s membership of the Council of Europe, the ECHR’s parent international organisation, is
not implicated in the recent Brexit farrago or its sequelae.
44 Note that this is not the familiar, unproblematic, case of an external (e.g., philosophical) critical concept
being applied to an internal (e.g., doctrinal) legal concept, since both these conceptions of the presumption of
innocence would be available to system participants as institutional resources for jurisprudential argument
and analysis.
45 Likewise, Lippke (2016, p. 53) wants to say that suspects who plead guilty for a bargained reduced
sentence ‘waive’ the presumption of innocence. This makes no sense to me. Suspects enjoy the presumption
of innocence (i.e., they must be treated as non-convicts, who just might be innocent) right up until they enter
a valid guilty plea, at which point they are convicted and the presumption of innocence expires in relation to
the offence(s) of conviction. Entering a valid guilty plea is a performative act by a party to the proceedings
with specified institutional consequences. Evidential analysis does not come into it at any point. There is
no work for any evidentiary presumption to perform because the prosecution does not need to prove its
case in these circumstances. (In those inquisitorial systems of criminal procedure which do not recognise
formal guilty pleas, admissions are treated evidentially as, possibly conclusive, proof of guilt. But in no
sense does the accused ‘waive’ the presumption of innocence in these circumstances, either. Rather, the
court concludes that the case has been proved to the requisite evidential standard and sentences accordingly,
or else reaches the opposite conclusion on the evidence and acquits.)
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Which brings me back to mental kryptonite and Duff’s half-hearted pluralism.
A major reason why the topic of ‘presumptions’ is traditionally regarded as one of
the most mind-bending and unsatisfactory chapters of the Law of Evidence (Mor-
gan 1937; Thayer 1889) is the ease with which legal or evidentiary presumptions
of fact can be confused and confounded with factual inferences. Legal presumptions
are evidentiary devices directing or permitting a factual inference to be drawn where
that inferential conclusion would not, or possibly might not, otherwise have been
reached by ordinary inferential reasoning based on evidence presented in the case.
Legal presumptions enable factfinders to bridge epistemic gaps, for a variety of con-
textual policy reasons. They authorise verdicts, by process of law, that could not (or
might not) otherwise be achievable on the proven facts. Although the conceptual dis-
tinction between legal presumption and factual inference is sharp and clear, there is
a marked propensity—possibly owing to linguistic laxity, or simply the intimacy of
their interrelationship—for lawyers to get presumptions and inferences muddled up
in practice. It is not difficult to point to notorious instances of this confusion in legal
reasoning,46 and it can produce all manner of mischief when it takes hold—includ-
ing potentially undermining the safety on appeal of an otherwise sound conviction
or contributing to a miscarriage of justice at trial. Crucially for present purposes, the
presumption of innocence is not traditionally regarded in Evidence law theory as an
evidentiary presumption. Thayer fulminated against lawyers’ failure to respect this
vital distinction47; and to this day, authoritative textbooks on the Law of Evidence
routinely caution against treating the presumption of innocence as an evidentiary or
true legal presumption (e.g., Munday 2018, pp. 134–135).
Duff does not acknowledge, let alone employ or respect, the conceptual distinc-
tion embedded in traditional common law thinking between (in my terminology)
‘evidentiary’ and ‘jurisprudential’ presumptions. He treats ‘presumptions’ as unitary
entities, that can in principle relate to any object. So we can speak, in Duffian terms,
of presuming ‘innocence’ or of any other contested fact48 in litigation, including facts
constitutive of an offence. On this view, ‘[t]he official or body who is to reach the
verdict (the judge(s), the jury) is to presume, of the defendant, that he is innocent
of the offence for which he is being tried. The presumption protects the defendant
against conviction and punishment for that crime unless it is defeated; what defeats
it is proof of guilt to the requisite standard’ (Duff 2013, 170, footnote omitted).49
46 See e.g., R v Sir Francis Burdett (1820) 4 B & Ald 95, 122-4; 106 ER 873, 883, where Best J stated,
‘[w]e are not to presume without proof. We are not to imagine guilt, where there is no evidence to raise the
presumption. But when one or more things are proved, from which our experience enables us to ascertain
that another, not proved, must have happened, we presume that it did happen, as well in criminal as in civil
cases’. Abbott CJ, ibid 161 & 898, was not much clearer: ‘A presumption of any fact is, properly, an inferring
of that fact from other facts that are known; it is an act of reasoning; and much of human knowledge on all
subjects is derived from this source’.
47
‘The effect of the presumption of innocence, so far from being that of furnishing to the jury evidence—i.e.,
probative matter, the basis of an inference—is rather the contrary…. [I]n no case is there a weighing, a
comparison of probative quality, as between evidence on one side and a presumption on the other’: (Thayer
1897, pp. 197–202).
48 If you are squeamish about normative facts, feel free to substitute with ‘contested proposition’.
49 Duff’s commitment to an evidentiary interpretation of the presumption of innocence is evident throughout
his quite extensive writings on the topic. Also see e.g., Duff (2007, p. 239): ‘Common sense or so-called
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In consequence, Duff’s account of the presumption of innocence does not merely
inadvertently carry the contagion of mental kryptonite, it positively trades on eliding
the (jurisprudentially essential) distinction between presumptions and inferences. The
following passage exemplifies Duff’s general theoretical reconstruction, applied to
two illustrative50 sets of criminal offences in English law (selling adulterated food51
in the first example, and official corruption52 in the second):
The Food Safety Act gives legal force to an expectation that shopkeepers who
sell food should not only take appropriate precautions to make sure that the food
they sell is safe; but should also, if they do sell food that is unsafe, be ready to
explain what happened, and to offer evidence that they had taken appropriate
precautions. Given such expectations, proof that a shopkeeper sold unsafe food
creates a presumption that she was negligent, and defeats the PoI; the burden then
lies on her to rebut that presumption of guilt by offering evidence that suffices,
if not rebutted, at least to create a reasonable doubt about whether she was
negligent. Similarly, the Prevention of Corruption Act formalizes an expectation
of civil servants that, if they accept gifts from contractors, they must be ready to
explain (to offer evidence) that the gift was not corrupt: given that expectation,
proof of the receipt of such a gift creates a presumption of corruption, which
it is up to the civil servant to defeat, by offering evidence that suffices to create
a reasonable doubt as to whether it was corrupt. (Duff 2012, p. 55, footnote
omitted, my emphasis)
Now, it must be said that legal provisions involving presumptions, ‘reverse onus
clauses’ and affirmative defences are complex and typically open to a variety of
jurisprudentially plausible interpretations. The relevant law is not always ordered
Footnote 49 continued
“factual” presumptions express ordinary rules of extra-legal reasoning and inference: if we see smoke, we
can reasonably presume that there is a fire until we find evidence to the contrary; if we see someone pull the
trigger of a loaded gun that is pointed towards another person, we can reasonably presume that he intended
to shoot that person until we are given an alternative explanation’ (footnote omitted, my emphasis); (Duff
2005, pp. 138–139): ‘Citizens are not in general required to prove their innocence in a criminal court. Even
if someone has caused serious, potentially criminal, harm, the prosecution must prove not just the actus
reus (the causation of harm), but mens rea; proof of the actus reus cannot by itself mandate an inference
to guilt… [I]n making it [the accused’s] responsibility to explain herself, the law requires the court to treat
a failure or inability to explain herself as evidence that she had failed in her duty: it would then not be
reasonable to doubt her guilt if it is proved that the machinery was unsafe, and she offered no evidence
that she had taken all reasonably practicable steps to make it safe. Proof that the machinery was not safe
grounds a presumption that she had not taken all reasonably practicable steps, and thus constitutes proof
beyond reasonable doubt of her guilt unless she rebuts it’ (footnote omitted, my emphasis).
50 Neither provision was still English law when the essay was published, but this does not affect their value
as hypothetical illustrations.
51 Food Safety Act 1990, s.22. The Section 8 offence cited by Duff was repealed, with effect from 1 January
2005, by the General Food Regulations 2004/3279, reg 10(a). The relevant duty not to place unsafe food
on the market is now contained in EU Regulation 178/2002, Art 14, the breach of which is an offence in
England (only) by virtue of the Food Safety and Hygiene (England) Regulations 2013/2996, reg 19. (Law
can be tricky to find. It seems a reasonable division of interdisciplinary labour for philosophers to rely on
lawyers to perfect incidental doctrinal details.).
52 Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, s.2, which operated in conjunction with the Prevention of Corruption
Act 1906 and the Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889; all subsequently repealed and replaced by
offences requiring proof of improper motive or misfeasance by the Bribery Act 2010.
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neatly in a single location,53 statutory provisions are sometimes hacked about by
piecemeal amendments, and may even be dispersed over several Acts of Parliament
(as in Duff’s corruption example). Even very experienced and knowledgeable jurists
can disagree about the proper construction of criminal statutes.54 Without entering
into the substance of jurisprudential controversies regarding particular offences or
defences, I will simply observe that: (1) Duff’s three (highlighted) references to ‘pre-
sumptions’ are all strictly superfluous, because the relevant statutory provisions can
be interpreted as establishing substantive criteria of liability subject to affirmative
defences without presuming anything; (2) the presumption of innocence is ‘defeated’
in these examples only in the trivial, and explanatorily superfluous, sense that the
presumption is always by definition exhausted when all offence elements have been
proved to the requisite standard authorising a guilty verdict; and (3) interjection of
phantom ‘presumptions’ into the analysis invites the very conflation, of presumptions
and inferences, that common lawyers have traditionally strained to avoid. The imag-
ined ‘presumption of guilt’ is especially problematic, since this ‘presumption’ has a
flavour of prejudgement that could never be squared with any jurisprudentially accept-
able presumption of innocence. If anything, the doctrinally orthodox reconstruction
would be that the prosecution’s proof of specified offence elements, to the requisite
standard, authorises an inference of guilt. That inferential conclusion may be rebutted
by proving the affirmative defence. Specifically with regard to these two illustra-
tive provisions, however, even this more benign reinterpretation seems superfluous. It
would be more elegant, as well as arguably doctrinally superior, to say that proof of
specified offence elements constitutes the proof of the relevant offences, in the absence
of proof of non-liability. Statutory presumptions qualifying material offence elements
operate—at least sometimes—to reconfigure the prosecution’s probative task by, in
effect, dispensing with proof of those elements,55 even when such presumptions are
legally rebuttable.56 Within the context of a contested trial, neither inferences nor
presumptions need be made in proving Duff’s illustrative crimes. This point appears
53 A good illustration is R v Hunt [1987] AC 352, HL; discussed by Roberts and Zuckerman (2010,
pp. 269–271).
54 For a smorgasbord of doctrinal arguments and competing interpretations, see Stumer (2010), Roberts
(2014a, b), Hamer (2007), Ashworth (2006), Dennis (2005) and Roberts (2002b).
55 So on this interpretation, we are dealing with offences containing elements of ‘strict liability’. But it will
always require close textual analysis and interpretation to determine whether a particular statute creates
a presumption and, if so, what its legal status and effects might be. For further illustrations and exegesis,
see R v K(M); R v Gega [2019] QB 86, [2018] EWCA Crim 667; R v Foye [2013] EWCA Crim 475; R v
Williams (Orette) [2013] 1 WLR 1200; [2012] EWCA Crim 2162.
56 Duff rightly insists that irrebuttable presumptions are really just rules of substantive law expressed in
evidential terms but with no genuine evidentiary functions: ‘These are not… properly “presumptions” that
mandate an inference from a proven fact p to a further fact q; they are disguised substantive rules of law
that help define the relevant offence… We should call such provisions constitutive or definitional rules
rather than “presumptions”’ (Duff 2007, pp. 240–241). But designating a presumption rebuttable does not,
as Duff supposes, authorise a fact-finder to ‘presume’ a material fact. Rather, it presents the accused with
an opportunity to evade liability by disproving that fact. If the burden of production is not satisfied, the
‘presumed’ fact need not be mentioned at all; although the prosecutor might choose as a strategic matter to
prove it anyway. Legal presumptions do not prevent the benefited party from electing to prove any presumed
fact by evidence and inference in the normal way (e.g., because the prosecutor knows that the accused is
going to try to disprove it). If the potentially exculpatory fact is neither proved nor disproved the accused
is still guilty, and the jury will be directed accordingly.
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particularly clearly in relation to the corruption offences qualified by Section 2 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, which—prior to its fairly recent repeal—‘deemed’
payments of money, gifts or other consideration to be corrupt unless and until proved
otherwise, irrespective of inferential reasoning (or epistemic presumption). ‘Deem-
ing’ is the language of legal stipulation shorn of any epistemological or evidentiary
dimension, and in fact involves no express statutory ‘presumption’ at all.57
What is going on here? My methodological diagnosis proceeds in three steps.
As a first clarification, Duff seems to approach the issue from a primarily legislative
perspective, external to the dynamics of litigation. The thought may be that the statutory
provision itself (‘the law presumes…’), or perhaps Parliament when enacting it, is
making a presumption that the acts prescribed are sufficiently culpable to warrant
criminal sanctions in the absence of proof to the contrary. Such personification of
legislative reasoning is intelligible, but hardly very illuminating for those working
with such provisions. If the point is that some criminal law offences are excessively
widely-drawn or target behaviour that is not morally culpable, why not just say that?
Subsequently, however, Duff appears to slip into describing how a fact-finder might
reason in an individual case, e.g., by ‘presuming’ one factual component of liability
(negligence, corruption) unless this ‘presumption’ is ‘rebutted’. This elision calls for
a second diagnostic clarification. It is not unusual for non-lawyers addressing legal
issues to attempt to reconstruct the fact-finding process,58 but this is not—strange
to say—how legal practitioners and procedural scholars in the common law world
generally approach criminal evidence and procedure. Fact-finding in common law
criminal adjudication is paradigmatically a blackbox activity undertaken by lay juries
or magistrates. Although trial judges do have ancillary fact-finding responsibilities in
criminal trials (Pattenden 2009), their main jurisprudential task is to direct juries in
relation to the jury’s deliberations and verdict; whilst advocates are primarily in the
business of making corresponding submissions to the court, either in the form of rival
narratives impressed upon the jury during the course of the trial or in closing speeches
or through doctrinal legal and factual arguments pitched to the judge (e.g., regarding
the admissibility of evidence). For these, quintessentially juridical operations it is
essential that legal ‘presumptions’ are correctly characterised, and never, ever, mixed
up with inferences of fact.
The third strand of the diagnosis conjectures an explanation for the half-hearted
nature of Duff’s methodological pluralism. There is nothing obviously linguistically
extravagant or unconventional about Duff’s deployment of the term ‘presumption’.
The OED’s third definition of ‘presumption’ as a noun is: ‘the action of taking for
57 Thus, in R v Webster [2011] 1 Cr App R 16, [2010] EWCA Crim 2819, [13] the Court of Appeal ruled
that ‘[t]he effect of the Section 2 deeming provision is to re-define the offence of corrupt payments to such
public servants by providing that in respect of the maker of the gift: it shall be an offence for a person holding
or seeking to obtain any contract with a public body to make any gift to a servant of that public body unless
the giver proves that the gift was not made corruptly as a reward or inducement’ (original emphasis). The
Court when on to hold that, in light of the changed procedural landscape since the Prevention of Corruption
Act 1916 was enacted, s. 2 could be ‘read down’ under the strong interpretative power conferred on the
courts by s. 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
58 Another debate in Evidence theory in which a reflex focus on fact-finding produces confusion, in my
opinion, concerns Bayesian efforts to model probative value and forensic/juridical proof: cf. Friedman
(2000).
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granted or presuming something; assumption, expectation, supposition; an instance
of this; a belief based on available evidence’.59 Duff’s usage seems fairly standard
amongst philosophers,60 especially those who are interested in the language, structure
and dynamics of argumentation.61 Needless to say, as a fully committed methodolog-
ical pluralist, I have no objection to philosophers framing and using concepts for their
own philosophical purposes. Far be it from me to purport to judge the legitimacy of
theoretical projects in the abstract, or to disqualify—on what basis?—attempts to elu-
cidate the presumption of innocence as a trans-jurisdictional normative ideal largely
shorn of procedural tradition or grounding in institutional facts. I cannot see why any-
body should find such accounts jurisprudentially compelling, but this is only to restate
(recalling ET again) the constitutive influence of motivation and (disciplinary) method
on conceptual definition and exegesis. I am certainly not promoting a transdisciplinary
conception of the presumption of innocence as uniquely and exclusively prescriptive
(cf. Weigend 2013). Conversely, if jurisprudential analysis were completely exhausted
by descriptive exegesis and rehearsals of primary legal sources, the fact that positive
law conceptions of the presumption of innocence departed from philosophers’ idealist
reconstructions, and from each other trans-jurisdictionally, would be wholly unexcep-
tional (and uninteresting) from a normative point of view.
The problem arises, it seems to me, when concepts framed for one set of disciplinary
tasks are unthinkingly extrapolated to new contexts and purposes for which they may
be ill-suited; that is, when methodological presumptions are presumptuous. Duff, like
Lippke, propounds an evidentiary interpretation of the presumption of innocence with-
out ever, to my knowledge, actively considering whether this conceptualisation is apt
for particular institutional uses or applications. Are evidentiary (including epistemic)
conceptions of the presumption of innocence intelligible to criminal court judges and
practising lawyers, for example? Would thinking about the presumption of innocence
in this way help legal practitioners to do their jobs better? Would it enlighten policy-
makers, improve the quality of criminal legislation or advance the cause of intelligent
law reform? That evidentiary conceptions lack any firm doctrinal basis, certainly in
English law and probably in common law jurisprudence generally, is a threshold rea-
son to doubt their general suitability for legal scholarship’s theoretical and practical
59 Note that the final clause equates presumption with inference. Also note the OED’s first definition: ‘The
taking upon oneself of more than is warranted by one’s ability, position, right, etc.; forward or overconfident
conduct or opinion; arrogance, effrontery, pride; an act, instance, or state of presumption, arrogance, or
overconfidence’.
60 See e.g., Rescher (2006), and Dudman (1992) (who equates ‘presumption’ with popular (false) belief).
Cf. Ullman-Margalit (1983, pp. 147–148), who rightly insists that ‘[p]resumption rules belong in the realm
of praxis, not theory… the instruction is this: given p, make q a premise in the rest of the pertinent piece
of your practical reasoning’. Ullman-Margalit expressly rejects an epistemic interpretation of presump-
tions (drawing on legal literature) and studiously avoids confusing presumption with inference. But there
remains some distance to cover in extrapolating from her general conception of presumptions to particular
institutional and juridical applications.
61 See e.g., Walton (2008, p. 156): ‘When you make an assertion, you are obliged to offer evidence to
support it… When you make a presumption, you are not obliged to offer a justification for it, but you are
obliged to give it up if the other party can disprove it’. Cf. Walton (2014), committing the different cardinal
sin of speaking of ‘shifting’ burdens of proof in the context of trials. Walton does, however, caution that ‘it
seems best to treat the expression “presumption of innocence” as not representing a kind of presumption at
all’ (ibid. 57).
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projects. When theorists start talking about ‘defeating’, ‘rebutting’ or ‘waiving’ the
presumption of innocence (to say nothing of ‘presumptions of guilt’), those schooled
in common law jurisprudence must be on their guard. If, to cap it all, a toxic byprod-
uct of the evidentiary conception is intellectual kryptonite (as I am suggesting), legal
scholars and practitioners concerned with criminal evidence, procedure and proof have
compelling reason to reject it.
5 Conclusions: presumption of innocence lost… and found?
Although Blackstone’s 10:1 ‘ratio’ has colonised common law jurisprudence (espe-
cially in the USA) and enjoys broad cultural resonance, it is by no means clear how
exactly this idea relates to the presumption of innocence, either as an embedded fea-
ture of procedural tradition or as normative political morality. Contemporary theorists
such as Reiman and van den Haag, we observed, were surprised to discover the philo-
sophical immaturity of theoretical literature and debates. Inasmuch as theorising has
been informed by legal scholarship, the burden and standard of proof in criminal
trials have tended to dominate discussion, pushing broader normative and institu-
tional considerations to the margins. In the common law tradition the presumption
of innocence is routinely equated with the burden and standard of proof in criminal
adjudication. This conflation is understandable in light of lawyers’ doctrinal focus, but
intellectually stunted and plainly unsatisfactory from a more theoretically ambitious
perspective. The presumption of innocence might be conceptualised more holistically
as part of a theory of criminal procedure, which is one component of a theory of crim-
inal justice, which in turn is part of a comprehensive theory of justice—a theory that
addresses, and strives to answer, Socrates’ question,62 how shall we live (together,
flourishing)? In debates beset by terminological laxity and conceptual incontinence,
virtually everybody agrees that the presumption of innocence needs ‘rescuing’, or
‘taming, or ‘rethinking’, or at any rate that its meaning, functions and value urgently
stand in need of clarification. The best conception of the presumption of innocence,
considered from a jurisprudential perspective centrally concerned with criminal adju-
dication, would properly accommodate pertinent institutional facts, faithfully express
the core normative value of the presumption, and steer clear of logical fallacies and
predictable reasoning errors (such as the mental kryptonite of confounding legal pre-
sumptions with factual inference) known to infect and corrupt legal process. For legal
scholars specialising in criminal evidence and procedure, the judicial task of directing
juries and the advocate’s job of formulating arguments addressed to judges about how
to direct juries tend to be more salient than adjudicative fact-finding itself.
In light of these criteria for sound theorising, I propose that the presumption of
innocence is best conceptualised as a mid-level principle of political morality from
which a variety of more concrete procedural (and other) doctrinal principles, rules
and institutional practices may be derived and rationalised. The normative core of the
62
‘It is not a trivial question, Socrates said: what we are talking about is how one should live’: B. Williams
(1985, p. 1). Moreover, ‘[w]hen Socrates asks you a question, he wants to know what you think. It’s personal.
You cannot satisfy him by reporting what the wise say. You cannot satisfy him by reporting what most people
think’: Sorensen (2003, p. 59).
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presumption of innocence as a principle of political morality is the distinctive injustice
perpetrated by officially and publicly condemning a person for a crime of which he or
she has not (yet) been convicted and of which he or she might be innocent. Concomi-
tantly and partially derivatively, it serves to limit officials’ intervention in life, liberty,
security and property in the exercise of lawful powers to prevent, investigate, prosecute
and punish crime. The presumption of innocence entails that the formal process of
criminal adjudication must not be side-stepped or pre-empted. This precludes officials
from treating any person as though they are guilty of a crime when they have not been
formally convicted of it. The normative ground of the presumption of innocence lies
in the injustice of convicting the innocent or gratuitously hurting any person’s impor-
tant interests, particularly in liberty, property and reputation. A person is seriously
wronged whenever they are falsely convicted of a crime, and that wrong is especially
grave when the offence is serious and heavily censured and/or peculiarly socially stig-
matic. It does not follow that individuals have a right against wrongful conviction as
such, or that anybody is necessarily culpable when the innocent are convicted. It is
sometimes just an unfortunate feature of the world that people who are factually inno-
cent can appear very guilty by any realistic standard of epistemic warrant.63 But if it
subsequently, perhaps accidentally, transpires that a provable mistake has been made,
we do what we can to correct it, even in cases of nonculpable mistaken conviction
and even if the only compensation then practically feasible is posthumous exoneration
of the wrongly judicially executed.64 It is part of the inherent structural asymmetry
of criminal adjudication that, whilst some unpunished crimes are treated as bygones,
wrongful convictions can never65 be allowed to lie.66 The serious public wrongfulness
of convicting the innocent furnishes derivative justification for a range of procedural
(including evidentiary) safeguards against this eventuality, which simultaneously also
express official public commitment to minimising the risk, some or many or all of
which may be brought under the capacious rubric of the presumption of innocence,
conceptualised as a major structural girder in the normative architecture of criminal
justice.
This suggested reconceptualization remains to be tested systematically and more
comprehensively against pertinent institutional facts. The pertinence of particular
institutional facts in turn depends on the nature of the inquiry and its level of institu-
tional generality or concretisation, for example, whether one wishes to theorise about
the presumption of innocence as a trans-jurisdictional principle of ‘Anglo-American
jurisprudence’ or as a normative basis for doctrinal English law. As my sympathies lie
towards the doctrinal end of jurisprudential theorising, a full defence of my proposed
63 That is, setting aside culpable errors or prejudices for which particular criminal justice actors might
fairly be held responsible.
64 A tragic illustration is R v Timothy John Evans (1950) 34 Cr App R 72 (CCA), discussed by Kennedy
(1961), and Rubin (2007). Also see R v Derek Bentley (Deceased) [2001] 1 Cr App R 307 (CA).
65 Never, ever? Well, there is doubtless some liminal temporal horizon, but the claim to principled asym-
metry is vindicated so long as any prescription period on wrongful convictions is at least very substantially
longer than the (formal or sociological) prescription period for criminal offences; as it generally is in modern
legal systems.
66 Cf. ‘Inquiry finds Mary, Queen of Scots not involved in murder of husband’, Scottish Legal News, 28
September 2015 (relating to the murder of Lord Darnley in 1567), www.scottishlegal.com/article/inquiry-
finds-mary-queen-of-scots-not-involved-in-murder-of-husband (accessed 9 January 2019).
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conception of the presumption of innocence would require extensive engagement with
institutional sources and at a level of doctrinal technicality more refined than any single
article could offer. This would be a subtle and complex jurisprudential undertaking,
of a kind that few theorists ever contemplate. It is no simple matter to reconstruct
contemporary English’s law reception of foundational doctrines from the historical
sediment of ramified common law traditions. In a common law constitution even the
status of an evidentiary norm as ‘constitutional’ and the practical implications of that
designation, if any, are matters of jurisprudential controversy (see Roberts 2012; cf.
Stein 2008). But even the schematic outline sketched in this article establishes some
nearly axiomatic fixed points.
Firstly, English law emphatically endorses the presumption of innocence as a
common law principle, a central component of the ‘overriding objective’ of crim-
inal procedure,67 and an institutionally enumerated human right. Yet secondly, the
demands of institutional ‘fit’ are not as exacting as one might anticipate, given the
normative significance of the principle, because English law has generally concen-
trated on concretised derivative doctrines specifying the burden and standard of proof
(the Woolmington principle), leaving the presumption of innocence in the background
as a comparatively underspecified normative justification for institutional practices. To
this extent, the jurisprudential conception of the presumption of innocence is amenable
to theoretical development and reconstruction. Thirdly, the presumption of innocence
may support a range of evidentiary doctrines and institutional practices including par-
ticularised evidentiary presumptions, but it does not itself have any direct evidentiary
(including epistemic) applications. As Evidence specialists have always maintained,
‘the presumption of innocence’ is not that kind of presumption. Fourthly, the pre-
sumption of innocence recognised in English legal doctrine is procedural rather than
substantive. Although normatively reconstructing common law procedural traditions
is never as easy as simply reporting what appellate judges have declared in precedent
cases (a practical impossibility, since common law jurisprudence is endemically con-
flicted, gappy, and sometimes mistaken), when national and international judiciaries
are saying exactly the same thing,68 when there are strong institutional reasons for
holding the conceptual line, and when there are no authoritative sources or institution-
ally cognisable arguments for revision, criminal jurisprudence must treat the law as
clear and settled for the foreseeable future and work within its doctrinal parameters.
Rather than attempting to defend a particular, necessarily controversial, concep-
tion of the presumption of innocence, however, this article’s primary objectives were
more modestly diagnostic and methodological. Under the rubric of the Eternal Trian-
gle, according to which the conceptual definitions (what?), motivations (why?) and
research methods (how?) of any intellectual inquiry are mutually conditioning, we can
see that no proposed conception of the presumption of innocence is itself methodolog-
ically innocent. Each comes with its own baggage and costs. Furthermore, the puzzles
and difficulties attending particular conceptions are often attributable to selected fea-
67 Rule 1.1 of the Criminal Procedure Rules prescribes as the ‘overriding objective’ of criminal proceedings
in England and Wales ‘that criminal cases be dealt with justly’, defined in part as ‘acquitting the innocent
and convicting the guilty’.
68 See especially R v G [2009] 1 AC 92, [2008] UKHL 37; and G v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR
SE25.
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tures of the original set-up. They are artefacts of the researcher’s methodological
design. This is not necessarily a matter for criticism, provided that definitions, domains
and disciplinary methods have been chosen deliberately and are well-calibrated to their
intended purposes; or in other words, provided that they are not merely unexamined,
and possibly presumptuous, presumptions.
Finally, a pluralist approach to the presumption of innocence relativises theoretical
endeavours in a way that should automatically problematise any claim to have formu-
lated the one, true, all-purpose normative conception. Methodological pluralism is the
ultimate antidote to any presumptuous conceptual dogmatism. Pace Lippke and Duff,
the starting point when ‘ask[ing] about the meaning of the PoI and its proper role in
the criminal law’ is not the already theoretically-loaded series of questions ‘what must
be presumed, by whom, about whom, to what effect; what can defeat that presump-
tion; and when (if ever) the presumption need not be made’ Duff (2012, p. 51). This
is not a neutral or inevitable point of origin for theoretical inquiry: for why are we
bound to accept that answers to these questions are necessarily the answers we seek,
whoever ‘we’ are? On the assumption that the goodness of concepts must be substan-
tially if not wholly constituted by their instrumental (including explanatory) value,
the prior, methodological questions should always be: for whom is the presumption
of innocence being formulated, what is its disciplinary or operational domain, and
what practical (including normative) purposes does and should it serve? For those
with predominantly jurisprudential interests and concerns, the best conception of the
presumption of innocence must answer to the pragmatic dictates of legal reasoning
and address—through accommodation or mitigation—unavoidable institutional facts.
Those with different, or equivocating, theoretical agendas owe us some further expla-
nation of what their concepts are for, whom they think they are talking to, and to what
end.
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